As I'd written in a previous note, on our current Afghanistan involvement, I really believe so far that this is the classic "cluster fuck". Small indications: old battle tanks, and now possibly even a few old Sea Kings, and these are to do what exactly?
NATO is officially saying that Afghanistan is a non-conventional war:
"NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said ... that suicide bomber tactics proved that Taliban rebels could not defeat multinational forces through conventional warfare.
"The Taliban and the other spoilers of the process of nation-building and democracy in Afghanistan are having to go with these kinds of horrible tactics -- improvised explosive devices, suicide bombers and so on -- because they know they cannot beat NATO in other ways".
Robin Millard, AFP
October 23, 2003
Via AfghanNews.net
So why do we seem to be approaching the situation like the Russian's approached the Mujahadeen resistance?
We have, I really think, stumbled into a very complex multi-country and tribal political situation which among other things may require some diplomacy and Bismarck style thinking combined with a touch of clout. And yet, there is no indication that anyone in charge seems aware of the complexity. Of course the simple minded ministerial responses fed to the MSM, the House, and parliamentary committees are likely just a ruse, behind closed doors there is oodles of activity going on sorting out the various strands of a solution, some of which may not be military or even aid related.
In this regard, just in case, the busy bureaucrats on Sussex and Colonel By Drive may have missed Barnett Rubin's piece in the Wall Street Journal here's Carl Robichaud's summary from his blog, Afghanistan Watch:
"Rubin argues, in essence, that because the Taliban serve as useful agents in a broader regional struggle, they cannot be defeated until there is progress on Afghan-Pakistani-Indian relations, greater political freedom in Pakistan, and economic opportunity in the tribal areas. A narrow focus on killing terrorists and suppressing the Taliban--or even on empowering the Afghan government--cannot succeed."
Barnett Rubin
WSJ October 25, 2006
via Afghanistan Watch
Just an opinion? Maybe, but I think it provides a good short assessment of part of the situation that seems to be being ignored here. The simple-minded story being dished-out here right now - an aggressive military stance we are identified with, like this possible death of civilians linked to roads that can't be used or schools destroyed by local citizens frustrated by the Karzai central government - looks to me like a vicious circle with only limited hope for a successful outcome and a real potential to deteriorate into maybe not Iraq but something similar and just as nasty.
The place has a long history with complex interrelations between factions, tribes and countries and we seem to have willingly joined the flounder-around-gang who mean well but keep stubbing their toes and wondering why. Reading just a couple of longer pieces, out of curiosity, to give a flavour of, say, Pervez Musharraf's wrangling in Tribal Areas and a piece which provides a profile of these Tribal Areas can be startling. Every time I see O'Connor and Hillier before a committee in the House reciting their Speaking Points, long on adjectives and short on content, from their briefing books I cringe at how dumb and naive we must really look.
Trying to understand this mess is starting to remind me of dealing with our own First Nation disputes which, from the point of view of both the MSM and governments, can be characterized as: resisting simple descriptions, requiring an appreciation of a long history, and highly susceptible to partisan manipulation. All, of which means that an ordinary busy citizen, given a choice on how to evaluate our Afghanistan actions, will likely prefer a clean model of what to do - kill bad guys, complain about NATO allies, build roads, hand-out candies - to a Ruby Goldberg model - don't kill people you've labeled as bad guys and who are trying to kill you; don't destroy poppy crops; mediate between groups with names you can't pronounce and whose values are maybe alien to you; etc.; etc..
All of the above means that a Canadian minority federal government with, down home Reform Party tendencies and US neocon sinisterness is, I think, going to "stay the course" with the "kill/build" strategy while setting up a "stabbed in the back" scenario for use as the Afghanistan situation keeps turning on itself.
I hope I'm wrong.
As well as experts like Barnett Rubin, organizations have different views on how to handle the Afghanistan situation.
Senlis, the development and security think tank, the one that might have been banned from Afghanistan, has been holding a symposium and debate on Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan over the last 2 days in Ottawa.
At the end of the first day, October 24th, the organization issued a press release which suggested a "new" approach for Canada's involvement in Afghanistan that would "... move away from the aggressive US-led military approach and focus on poverty relief and development in order to engage with the local population and quell the rising insurgency."
The "new" approach which had been included in Senlis' October policy paper "Losing Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan. Canada´s Leadership to Break the Cycle of Violence in Southern Afghanistan" recommended that "... Canada should create a Special Canadian Emergency Task Force for Kandahar. Th[at] would include a specific Economic Emergency Plan for Kandahar with a specially appointed non-partisan Special Envoy with the authority to coordinate the military and development responses. A Canadian group of experts and organizations should be formed as part of the Emergency Task Force on Kandahar issues."
Senlis has a list of recommendations for what should be included in the new approach, which I've summarized below:
Canada should take the lead at the international and NATO level in Afghanistan and should convene an emergency meeting of NATO countries to develop a real campaign to win over the locals. This campaign would include stopping the killing and injuring of them.
To contain the the narcotics production problem, Canada should support the implementation of a poppy licensing system in Afghanistan.
To help calm the insurgency and engage with the local populations Canada should deliver an emergency food and aid package.
A series of Kandahar Jirgas (community meetings) should be organized in order to listen to the needs of the Afghan population – in this way, policy decision will be tailored to the populations’ real needs.
The emergency Task Force should organize the necessary infrastructure to enable Canadian citizens and organizations to be involved in helping Kandahar.
Senlis Press Release
October 24, 2006
A different approach that's for sure. The toning down of the aggressive military stance would be welcome, I suspect, by the locals as well as elements in the military establishment who have pointed out that the current tactic is not, nor will it, work. The poppy issue, whether it is sensible or not, could only be adopted if the US dropped its moralistic policy stance on narcotics - not very likely, eh. The food and aid elements are necessary and I'll bet Canadians already think that this is going on - both O'Connor and the International Development Minister certainly trumpet our good works but no one seems to be able to actually visit the projects nor give a complete itemization of them. And not too worry, O'Connor has told parliamentary committees that Canadian troops are feeding the hungry, though some NGOs on the ground dispute this.
My problem with the Senlis recommended new approach is really basic. The tone and gist of it seems to imply that we, Canada, actually take over the running of parts of the South of Afghanistan, specifically the province of Kandahar - we will hold community meetings (Jirgas) to decide Afghanistan policy and have a special envoy to run military and development operations. That suggestion is as nutty as the military imbedding agents in the government in Kabul, sounds very CPA and Bremerist, I think
As I've said this is a classic "cluster fuck", plain and simple.
I am really quite sorry for the troops on the ground.
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